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STATE POWER OVER THE FEDERAL
CONTRACTOR: A PROBLEM IN FEDERALISM*
ARTHUR S. MILLER**
INTRODUCTION
Striking a proper balance between the oft-conflicting claims of the
central and local governments is the continuing problem of a federal
system. The problem arises in two main ways. On the one hand, it
involves splitting up the jobs which any government must do between
the two governments and then ironing out conflicts when overlaps
occur. Here, the balance is often struck between the needs for uni-
formity of treatment and the interests served by viable local govern-
ments. Regulation of economic activities in interstate commerce furn-
ishes a ready example. Or it deals, on the other hand, with the direct
relationships between the two governments, their agencies and instru-
mentalities. Illustrative of this aspect is the wobbly path trod by the
United States Supreme Court in the development of the doctrine of
the intergovernmental tax immunity.
A facet of this second half of the problems of federalism has re-
cently bedome evident in the field of federal contracting. Brought
about by the continuing large-scale entry of the national government
into the commercial market, chiefly in the form of expenditures by
the military departments, the treatment to be accorded the federal
contractor is a problem of increasing importance. With the contract
device in frequent use by Congress as a means of attaining desired ob-
jectives in addition to fulfilling basic mat6riel requirements,' the
need has come for establishing the legal status of the federal contractor
and of setting out the law applicable to federal contracts. 2 To a large
extent problems of status revolve around the question of whether the
contractor with the federal agency is also amenable to state law and
regulation. This, in turn, raises in a new context ancient doctrines of
federal supremacy and intergovernmental relations. My purpose here
* This article is an expansion of remarks made by the author as a participant
in the Fourth Annual Institute on Government Contract Law held at George
Washington University in April, 1957.
** Professor of Law, Emory University; on leave of absence, 1957-58, as a
Guggenheim Fellow.
1. A discussion of the use of the contract device by the federal government
to attain certain nonprocurement objectives may be found in Miller, Govern-
ment Contracts and Social Control: A Preliminary Inquiry, 41 VA. L. REV. 27
(1955). A considerable amount of government regulation of business activity
does take place through resort to conditions attached to federal contracts.
2. The literature of government contract law is rapidly increasing, mostly
in the form of articles in legal periodicals. That a separate body of law-a
federal common law of government contracts-is being created cannot be
doubted.
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is that of inquiring into the questions involved in the status problem.
The focus will be dual in nature: (a) on the question of how far the
state may tax federal contractors and (b) on the state's power to
regulate those contractors under the broad scope of its police powers.
The question of state power over the federal contractor is one which
is peripheral to the main perspective of the procurement contract. It
does not deal with the technicalities of contract interpretation, or with
the principal preoccupations of either the federal procurement officer
or the contractor. Nevertheless, it is an important problem, one which
can have a very real effect on expenditures of the federal government
and on the activities of the contractor.3 The precise outer boundaries
of the problem area have not been fixed, although the comparatively
greater amount of litigation in the taxation field has resulted in a
greater development of the law. There have been few regulation
cases; and in those, the courts have displayed a tendency to use tax
cases as precedent in deciding regulation matters. Pending before
the Supreme Court at this writing are cases on both taxation and
regulation which are awaiting argument and decision in the term be-
ginning in October 1957; these will be discussed in detail below. When
decided, they may clarify much of what is still uncertain in the law
relating to the status of the federal contractor vis-A-vis the various
state governments.
In large measure both the federal officials, whose job it is to enter
the commercial market to fulfill the government's mat6riel needs, and
the federal contractor, wherever he may be and of whatever size he
may be, tend to look upon attempts by states to tax or regulate with a
skeptical eye. The state appears as some alien interloper whose
activities result only in hardship and delay to the contractor and con-
sequent annoyance and financial cost to the federal government. By
3. The billions of dollars being spent annually makes the entire question of
federal procurement an important one in the national economy. Walton
Hamilton has recently made the following observations: "[T]hrough the
placing of contracts, the Government has alike the power and opportunity to
affect the industrial structure. As the percentage which the military budget
bears to the national income rises, its capacity to shape the pattern of the
national economy is enhanced. The military, has exhibited a preference to
deal with the few rather than the many; it has shown reluctance to break
down a large order which can be filled only by a giant concern into a series
of smaller orders which will invite independents to bid. Thus the military,
with an eye solely to defense, gives an impact to the trend toward concentra-
tion .... In many areas of industry, growth or decline, success or bankruptcy,
depends upon how the military throws its weight around." HAMILTON, THE
POLITICS OF INDUSTRY 21-22 (1957).
"A budget for defense which takes a substantial part of the total product
of industries carries a vast power to shape the pattern of the economy. The
Department of Defense, for reasons which in military terms may be sound,
prefers to deal with the few rather than the many and to place orders with
single concerns for large quantities of materiel .... The result is that the
largest aggregate of purchasing power in the country is employed as an
instrument for the concentration, rather than the diffusion, of economic
wealth and power." Id. at 98.
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and large, accordingly, a prevailing idea in the federal procurement
circles seems to be that of avoiding, whenever possible, the impact
of state intervention into contractual matters. Running through
the procurement regulations is a thread of policy which has the
effect of trying to insulate federal contracting from state power of
whatever type. That this is not entirely justified is one of the con-
clusions which will be reached in this Article.
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
Before setting out the detailed state of legislation and judicial de-
cision in the problem area, it may be helpful to fit it into the larger
pattern of federal-state relations. This can be done in brief form.
Conflicts between the state and national governments have tradi-
tionally given rise to considerable litigation. A large amount of
classical constitutional law deals with the definition of the proper
scope of activity of each government and with their relationship to
one another. Speaking broadly, the historical pattern has been one of
judicial delineation of a system whereby both governments were
accommodated side by side, each performing its job without undue
interference from the other. This was early set in its pattern with
the reiteration by Chief Justice John Marshall of the principle of
federal supremacy in the area of the national government's delegated
powers. The case was McCulloch v. Maryland4 and the date was 1819.
Thereafter came the rise of the doctrine of reciprocal immunity of each
government with respect to the other-immunity from regulation and
immunity from taxation. Even so, it was not an entirely equal posi-
tion in which the two governments found themselves: the scale has
always reflected Marshall's belief that it should be tipped on the
side of the federal government. This was particularly true in taxation,
but also in regulation. To some extent, this federal pre-eminence was
articulated in the notion that activities of state governments can be
split into "governmental" and "proprietary" functions, while all fed-
eral activities are considered to be "governmental." 5
McCulloch is the seminal case which set the pattern of doctrinal
development in both tax and regulation matters. It established the
doctrine of federal immunity from state taxation, basing it on the
notion of federal supremacy, and became the landmark case in the
history of the intergovernmental tax immunity.6 Shortly thereafter, in
another tax case, the Supreme Court uttered a dictum which seems to
be the first Court statement on the question under inquiry here:
4. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
5. See Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule of Governmental Tax Immunity-
A Legal Myth, 11 FED. B.J. 3 (1950).
6. See Rakestraw, supra note 5, for a discussion.
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Can a contractor for supplying a military post with provisions, be re-
strained from making purchases within any State, or from transporting
the provisions to the place at which the troops were stationed? or could
he be fined and taxed for doing so? We have not heard these questions
answered in the affirmative. It is true, that the property of the contractor
may be taxed, as the property of other citizens; and so may the local
property of the Bank. But we do not admit that the act of purchasing,
or of conveying the articles purchased, can be under State control.7
So far as regulation is concerned, the decisions, relatively sparse,
have again set out what is essentially a situation of reciprocal im-
munity, but which is again slanted in favor of the national government.
In the cases which have been decided, a distinction is made between
the activities under state scrutiny-whether it is an actual federal in-
strumentality (as the Post Office Department) or whether it is a
private organization doing business with the government. The lead-
ing case is Johnson v. Maryland,8 in which Justice Holmes used the
McCulloch rationale to strike down a state attempt to require Post
Office truck drivers to get state drivers' licenses.
In large measure, thus, the historical pattern has been one of the
Supreme Court providing constitutional warrant for the unifying
forces of American society. Any local regulation of a federal activity,
whether or not it is part of the national government's actual ac-
tivities, has usually been invalidated. On the other hand, federal at-
tempts to regulate the activities of the states have at times been
upheld.9 The Court has given its imprimatur not only to national regu-
lation of economic matters under the interstate commerce clause, but
also to the few efforts of the federal government to tax or regulate the
actual activities of state governments.
It is against that background that the question of state power to
tax and regulate the federal government can be viewed. The basic
question involves a determination of whether the undoubted im-
munity of the federal government and its agencies from interference
of any type by state governments is to be extended to an entity
which is an instrumentality of the national government but not
actually a part of it. Also involved is the subsidiary question of the
power of Congress in this area, and the extent to which that body can
either immunize federal instrumentalities from state intervention or
remove such immunities.
THE STATE GOVERNMENTS VIS-A-VIS
THE FEDERAL CONTRACTOR
The question of state power over the federal contractor has be-
7. Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 867 (1824).
8. 254U.S. 51 (1920).
9. One of the most recent is California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
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come important only in recent years, largely because of the massive
continuing interventions which the federal government now makes
into the marketplace. As the largest buyer by far in the market, it
has a pervasive influence. 0 With regard to state governments the
fundamental principle followed by procurement officials is that of
avoiding as much state intervention into federal contracts as is possi-
ble. This is done largely through administrative decision, for Congress
has usually been silent on the point. And in this tactic of avoidance of
state power the federal government has found a really ally in the
private contractor.
State Power to Tax the Federal Contractor
Speaking generally, states have no power to tax the federal govern-
ment or any of its agencies. This notion found early expression in
Chief Justice Marshall's dictum that "the power to tax involves the
power to destroy" which he enunciated in McCulloch v. Maryland."
But a federal contractor is a private entity, one which acts auton-
omously save as limited by contract. Hence it is not, by the very fact
that it has a consensual agreement with a federal agency, immune
from state taxation. Its immunity, if any, only comes if it can be
considered to be so intimately connected with the national govern-
ment that it becomes, in a legal sense, a part of the Government. We
have noted above the doctrinal development which serves to insulate
the federal government from any state interference. To some extent
the problem of state taxation of the federal contractor requires an
application of the same concepts. In another sense, the problem
requires that a balance be struck between the interests served by
federal immunity from state intervention and the undoubted power of
the states to tax whatever exists within their respective jurisdictions.
In its decisional development the Supreme Court has tended to
follow a conceptual path. Rather than make what would be economic
judgments about the impact of a tax and what burden in fact a tax
imposes upon the federal government, the Court has erected what
can be called a "legal incidence" test of validity of the tax. Accord-
ingly, it is clear that states cannot tax a federal contractor if the
legal incidence of the tax falls directly on the federal government. 12
10. In addition to HAMIMTON, op. cit. supra note 3, see Miller, Military
Procurement Policies: World War II and Today, 42 Am. Ec6N. REv. 453 (Supp.
No. 2, 1952): "For over a decade, military appropriations and expenditures
have been the principal exogenous factors affecting the levels of employment,
output, and expenditure in the economy."
11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 431. Later answered by Justice Holmes when he
said that "The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits."
Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mlississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928), and
termed by Justice Frankfurter to be a mere "seductive.clich6," Graves v.
New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 489 (1939).
12. A recent illustration is Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110
(1954).
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The opposite is true: A state can tax a federal contractor if the inci-
dence of the tax is on the contractor even though the financial burden
of the tax is eventually passed on to the federal government. In this
manner, the Court escapes the necessity of measuring the actual
burden of the tax. At the same time, by dealing in concepts it is
able to use the type of language which lawyers are accustomed to
hearing.
13
This legal incidence test characterizes a great many of the tax
cases-perhaps all of them. Whatever the type of tax the state seeks
to levy-whether it is a property, gross income, privilege, sales or
use tax-the chief inquiry seems to be on the question of who has to
bear the initial burden of the tax. If it is the federal contractor, then
the tax is deemed proper and upheld; if it is the Government, then
the tax is bad and invalidated. The fact that the ultimate result in
both would be about the same, that is to say, the fact that the economic
burden would fall in both instances on the national government and
with about the same impact, has not altered the result.
Thus a state cannot tax either real or personal property the title
to which is vested in the United States government. The leading case
is United States v. County of Allegheny, decided in 1944.14 There the
Supreme Court held that an ad valorem general property tax on
machinery owned by the federal government and leased to one of
its contractors could not be taxed by the state. But it may be signifi-
cant that the state in this litigation sought to tax the entire value of
the property in question, not the leasehold value of the property in
the hands of the lessee. Would the result have been different had the
tax been levied on the possessory interest of the contractor, rather
than on the entire value of the machinery?
This question is not yet definitively resolved. Authority both ways
exists, but there has been no authoritative pronouncement by the
Supreme Court. Two California cases and a recent Wisconsin decision
indicate that some state courts have upheld taxes on federal property
when levied on less than the full ownership interest. In Kaiser Co.
v. Reid15 an ad valorem property tax was levied on the possessory
interest which Kaiser had as the tenant of shipyards owned by the
United States. Calling Kaiser a "tenant for years," the California
court found that such an interest was a real property interest and
hence taxable. The court rejected the claimed immunity predicated
13. Cf. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
139 (1956).
14. 322 U.S. 174 (1944). The fact that the United States owns some 25%
of the entire nation indicates the magnitude of tax loss involved. See Miller,
State Taxation of Federal Contractors: A Proposal, 4 J. PUB. L. 299 (1955);
Deming, Tax-free U.S. Industrial Property a Problem, 43 NAT'L MuNIc. REV.
95 (1954).
15. 30 Cal. 2d 610, 184 P.2d 879 (1947).
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on the Allegheny County case, on the basis that in that case "had
there been an attempt .. to segregate . . . [the] possessory interest
[of the bailee] from that of the United States, the tax on [the bailee's]
interest would have been upheld."'16 And in Timm Aircraft Corp. v.
Byram17 the same court reached a similar result in a case involving an
ad valorem tax on a bank deposit which the federal government had
established to assist the contractor in financing the contract. In 1957
Wisconsin's Supreme Court, in American Motors Corp. v. Kenosha,18
also found a taxable interest in federal property in the hands of a
contractor.
Contrary results have been reached by other courts. Presently in
the course of litigation in California, for example, are cases in which
Los Angeles County attempted to tax the possessory interest of con-
tractors in certain items of personalty. The tax was levied on the
interest the contractors were asserted to have in airplanes and other
military end-items in the possession of the contractors. At this writing,
the only decision has been in the trial court. There, an oral decision
was rendered March 22, 1957, striking down the tax, Judge Vernon W.
Hunt stating that "this personal property was, on the tax date, merely
in the temporary permissive custody and use" of the contractors;
hence, the contractors' interest was not "personal property 'capable
of private ownership' within the meaning of the California Constitu-
tion."' 9 And in Detroit v. Murray Corp.,20 the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion. Using Allegheny
County as controlling precedent, the court invalidated an attempt to
tax items in the contractor's possession, the technical legal title to
which had passed to the federal government through operation of the
"partial payment" clause of the standard procurement contract.21
This case, combined with two others, is presently on the docket of
the United States Supreme Court and should reach decision during
the October 1957 term of the Court.
Whether the highest Court will uphold these conceptual attempts
to evade past conceptualism of the Court is uncertain. Certainly it is
the demand of the procurement officials of the federal government
that it not do so. Large sums of money are involved, running into
millions of dollars. The impact on the military budget, if the taxes
16. 184 P.2d at 890.
17. 34 Cal. 2d 632, 213 P.2d 715 (1950).
18. 274 Wis. 315, 80 N.W.2d 363 (1957).
19. Judge Hunt said that he was bound in his decision by Douglas Aircraft
Co. v. Byram, 57 Cal. App. 2d 311, 134 P.2d 15 (1943). This case has great
financial significance, for millions of dollars of potential tax are involved.
20. 234 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 352 U.S. 963 (1957).
21. Under the partial payment clause, title to the property upon which the
partial payment is made prior to completion of the contract vests in the
government in its condition at the time of payment.
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were to be upheld, could be substantial.22 On the other hand, loss of
the potential tax income to the states could make a considerable
dent in state and local revenues. The Court has not displayed any
particular concern in the past for the fiscal needs of the states, an
occasional statement to the contrary notwithstanding (for example,
"interstate commerce must pay its way"), so it may well be that the
decision will be that of refusing to recognize dual interests in personal
property and thus invalidating the taxes. Some evidence to the
contrary may be found in the five to four decision in 1956 in Offutt
Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy.23 In that case the five majority
justices found a congressional expression of consent that state taxation
be allowed of a leasehold of land on an Air Force base. In the course
of the opinion, Justice Frankfurter had this to say: "Petitioner also
argues that the state tax, measured by the full value of the buildings
and improvements, is not the 'lessee's interest' but is on the full value
of property owned by the Government. Labeling the Government as
'owner' does not foreclose us from ascertaining the nature of the real
interests created and so does not solve the problem."24 This may be
a straw in the wind, portending a possible decision in which split
property interests are recognized.
The other types of taxes exhibit patterns similar to that in property
taxation. Thus in James v. Dravo Contracting Co.,25 decided in 1937,
the gross income of an independent federal contractor was found to
be the property of the contractor; accordingly, a state gross receipts
tax on that income was not invalid merely because it could be and was
in fact passed on to the federal government. It is noteworthy that the
federal government, in a rare burst of generosity, argued for the
validity of the state's exaction in this case.26 It soon repented, how-
ever, and strongly opposed the imposition of state sales and use taxes
on its contractors a few years later. But the change in heart came
22. The taxes involved in the litigation in Los Angeles City and County
would eventually run into many millions of dollars. See note 19, supra.
Federal procurement officers have, without statutory warrant but relying on
judicially-created law, consistently opposed attempts by states to tax federal
property and federal contractors. In addition to the use of the partial payment
clause, see note 21, supra, as a device to avoid taxes, the Armed Services
Procurement Regulation contains the following statement of policy: "As a
general rule, Government purchases are exempt from state and local taxes.
This exemption shall be made use of to the fullest extent available, by means
of purchase on a tax exclusive basis and execution of an approved tax
exemption certificate." 32 C.F.R. § 11.301 (1954). Even so, the federal officials
recognize that contractors are required to pay some state taxes and make
appropriate provision for reimbursement. See 32 id. § 11.401.
23. 351 U.S. 253 (1956); Note, 18 GA. BAR. J. 202 (1956).
24. 351 U.S. at 261, citing Millinery Center Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner,
350 U.S. 456 (1956). See Fort Dix Apartments Corp. v. Borough of Wrights-
town, 225 F.2d 473 (3rd Cir. 1955).
25. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
26. An account of this singular act may be found in 1 FRumD, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEms 701 (1954).
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too late to stem the tide: in the companion cases of Alabama v. King
& Boozer27 and Curry v. United States28 such taxes were upheld when
imposed on independent cost-plus-fixed-fee federal contractors. In
both of these cases, the Supreme Court found that the contractor was
not an agent or instrumentality of the government. Had it done so,
the result probably would have been different, as witness the 1954
decision in Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock.29 And in 1953 a state tax
laid upon the storage of federally-owned gasoline was upheld as being
a tax on the privilege of storing, and thus on the contractor, not on
the property itself.30 Again, the dominant principle was, to use the
late Thomas Reed Powell's term, not "who is hurt, but who is hit."3'
In two other doctrinal areas states have been inhibited in taxing
the federal contractor. The first of these is the exemption which goods
shipped in interstate commerce enjoy from state taxation. The federal
procurement officials have seized upon this judicially created consti-
tutional doctrine to build another method of tax avoidance. The tech-
nique is to designate a point at which the federal government takes
title and delivery to property beyond the territorial boundaries of
the state of manufacture.32 Military end-items, for example, which are
delivered across state lines are not subject to local sales taxes, the
legal incidence of which falls on the federal contractor. The cases are
relatively sparse on the precise point, but a 1938 decision, J. D. Adams
Manufacturing Co. v. Storen,33 clearly sets out the prevailing rule.
Of course, this scheme of tax avoidance could not work where partial
payments are used by the procurement officials, with the consequent
passage of legal title on making of such payments.
The other inhibition on state power to tax is one which is the crea-
ture of the individual states. Some state tax statutes have provisions
that a purchaser who buys items for resale does not have to pay a
sales tax on the first sale. The question has come up in state courts
of whether a federal cost-plus-fixed-fee contractor is a purchaser for
resale and thus exempt from local sales taxes. The few cases which
have so far been decided indicate that this area of immunity from
local taxation may also be available to some federal contractors.34
The foregoing outlines in brief form the existing state of the law on
state power to tax federal contractors. In sum, tax doctrine is based
on a rather arid conceptualism which the Supreme Court has followed.
Since the impact of taxes is economic or financial, it would seem
27. 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
28. 314 U.S. 14 (1941).
29. 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
30. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U.S. 495 (1953).
31. POWELL, op. cit. supra note 13, at 141.
32. See, for a brief discussion, Miller, supra note 14, at 311-12.
33. 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
34. See Miller, supra note 14, at 313-14.
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that a more realistic approach would be that of assessing the economic
impact of various state taxes on the federal government. But this the
Court has not done. And neither has Congress seen fit to enter the
scene and indicate its desires. Even though under prevailing law
Congress has power to immunize federal contractors from state taxa-
tion or to remove existing immunities,35 it has not succeeded in doing
more than peck around the edges of the problem area.36 At stake
here are two economic interests which must be balanced-the interest
in military and other federal procurement being carried on at as low
a cost as possible and the interest in financially viable state and local
governments. The failure of the Supreme Court to come to grips with
the real problem and the failure of Congress to do anything about it
at all is an unedifying commentary on the activities of those two
august branches of government.
37
State Power to Regulate the Federal Contractor
Compared with taxation, little litigation has arisen over the extent
of state power to regulate federal contractors. Consequently, there
is considerable doubt as to the permissible limits of such regulation.
As Corwin recently put it, "The extent to which States may go in
regulating contractors who furnish goods or services to the Federal
Government is not as clearly established as their right to tax such
dealers."38 Those cases which have been decided, moreover, are some-
what contradictory.
The most recent statement by the Supreme Court came in December
1956, in Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas.39 In that case an attempted
regulation of construction contractors was invalidated. The Air Force
solicited bids for the construction of refueling facilities on an air base
in Arkansas. A state statute required all contractors on any construc-
tion project of $20,000 or over to obtain a license from the state. The
low bidder, a Fort Worth, Texas firm, received the contract, but did
not obtain the license. Arkansas fined the contractor under the terms
of the statute. After the state's supreme court had upheld the statute,
35. See e.g., Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952), later over-
ruled by Act of Aug. 13, 1953, c. 432, 67 Stat. 575 (1953).
36. Congress has had before it bills to provide for payments to local gov-
ernments in lieu of taxes on federally owned property. See, e.g., S. 2473, 83rd
Cong., 1st Sess.; Hearings before the Senate Committee on Government
Operations on S. 2473, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). But it has not enacted
any important legislation in the field. In the 1955 report of the Kestnbaum
Commission, it was recommended that the federal government "inaugurate
a broad system of payments in lieu of property taxes to State and local
governments." U.S. COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT 108 (1955).
37. Cf. POWELL, op. cit. supra note 13, at c. 4.
38. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 726
(Corwin ed. 1953).
39. 352 U.S. 187 (1956), 10 VAND. L. REV. 857 (1957).
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resort by the contractor and the Air Force to the United States
Supreme Court brought a reversal and invalidation of the licensing
requirement so far as it applied to federal projects. In a per curiam
decision in which Johnson v. Maryland40 was cited as controlling, the
Court said:
Subjecting a federal contractor to the Arkansas contractor license
requirement would give the State's licensing board a virtual power of
review over the federal determination of "responsibility" [of bidders] and
would thus frustrate the expressed federal policy of selecting the lowest
responsible bidder.41
The principle of federal supremacy was the controlling factor.
To that decision three other cases should be compared. In Penn
Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n42 a Pennsylvania statute regulat-
ing the price of milk being sold to the Army was upheld. The fact that
an economic burden was passed on to the federal government did not
taint the regulation by the state. The Court relied principally on the
notion that a valid local interest was being pursued at the cost of
only slight interference with a federal activity. A balance of the inter-
ests involved was struck in favor of local regulation. A companion
case, Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Dep't of Agriculture,43 reached a
somewhat different result, but should not be thought to be contradic-
tory. In it, the Court struck down a state attempt to set milk prices
in sales to the military because the sale and delivery took place on a
federal enclave. And in James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, a New
York safety requirement for electrical wiring was upheld in its appli-
cation to a federal contractor.
Based on the four cases just mentioned-evidence too sparse to
formulate more than tentative conclusions-it would appear that a
state regulation of a federal contractor will be upheld when the
degree of interference is relatively slight as compared to the interest
being served by the state action. Thus, in the Leslie Miller case the
interference was major (in effect, substituting state judgment for
federal in choice of contractor) while the local interest was compara-
tively insignificant. (Left unstated, but perhaps present, was the
view that the Arkansas statute in that case could have been looked
upon as an attempt to favor local business interests at the expense of
out-of-state firms. Such a "balkanizing" policy could scarcely have
40. 254 U.S. 51 (1920). The most that can be said about using the Johnson
case as controlling authority is that it is irrelevant. The factual situations of
the two cases are not even remotely similar. The per curiam opinion by the
Court leaves, as do many of the recent opinions by various justices, much to
be desired so far as clarity is concerned.
41. 352 U.S. at 190.
42. 318 U.S. 261 (1943).
43. 318 U.S. 285 (1943).
44. 309 U.S. 94 (1940).
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been viewed with favor by the Supreme Court.) And in the milk-price
cases, the added economic burden on the federal government is slight
viewed against the state interest being protected. The same may be
said for the Sadrakula case. The end result may well be a "substantial
burden" test of the permissible limits of state regulation of federal
contractors. Under that test, any regulation of a private enterprise
which substantially interferes with a federal function would be
stricken. Under such a test the Supreme Court is engaging in an inter-
est-balancing endeavor, rather than mechanically applying concepts.
Whether that conclusion is valid or not may well be determined by
the decision in a case now pending before the United States Supreme
Court: United States v. Public Utilities Commn.45 At issue is a 1955
amendment to the state's Public Utilities Code. This amendment 6
changed the former policy of special treatment of truck shipments
of United States property by providing that "the Commission may
permit common carriers to transport property at reduced rates for
the United States ... to such extent and subject to such conditions as
it may consider just and reasonable." Contesting the validity of this
amendment on the dual grounds of an unreasonable and unnecessary
burden on the federal government and also of an unreasonable burden
on interstate commerce, the United States prevailed before a three
judge federal court. The court agreed on the former ground and did
not find it necessary to rule on the latter. It invoked General Nathan
Bedford Forrest's oft-quoted admonition "To git thar fustest with
the mostest men" and concluded that the amendment was "invalid,
void and of no effect, as contravening the provisions of the United
States Constitution relating to the national defense. . .."47
Were this a case where state regulation would merely add a rather
small pecuniary burden on the federal government little doubt exists
that the regulation would be upheld by the Supreme Court. The
Penn Dairies case would be directly in point. But the government has
treated it as more than that. All stops were pulled out by the military
departments before the district court. Invoked, in addition to the shade
of General Forrest, was the horrible possibility that state regulation
would end in "an administrative morass out of which we would never
fight our way, [and] we would never win the war!"48 (Left unmen-
tioned was what war the court had in mind.) Also, the problem of
maintaining the security of secret military goods was raised, in addi-
tion to the view that state regulation would greatly add to the cost of
transportation. An array of high-ranking officers appeared as wit-
45. 141 F. Supp. 168 (N.D. Cal. 1956). For a contrary result see Hughes
Transportation v. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 221, 121 F. Supp. 212 (1954).
46. CAL. PUB. UTn.. CODE ANx. § 53 (Deering, Supp. 1957).
47. 141 F. Supp. at 190.
48. Id. at 176.
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nesses, all testifying to the chaos which they envisaged would result
from enforcement of the state law. All of these representations were
accepted by the court, which seemingly was overwhelmed by the
display of military officialdom and the graciousness of the officers
even to appear in court. Judge Lemmon's rather florid opinion ended
on the following note:
In a dictatorship, the warlords do not even demand-much less request-
authority to negotiate with private parties for the supply of their war
needs. Autocrats take what they want!
It is therefore a heartening spectacle, in a constitutional democracy, to
see a group of military men, speaking for the sovereign itself, appear in
a civil court to plead to be allowed to carry out their constitutional func-
tions by being permitted to contract freely with privately owned carriers
to supply the government's transportation needs.49
Vhether such an array of military brass using similar arguments
would also overawe and persuade the United States Supreme Court
remains to be seen. Recent Court decisions indicate that present-day
justices are able to place hyperbole in its proper perspective. Accord-
ingly, it is likely that the Court will weigh the greater, albeit slight,
added burden to the federal activity against the state's interest in the
regulation of common carriers. In striking a balance between the
two, whatever the result may be, the Court will have the opportunity
to clarify some of the present doubt about the extent of permissible
regulation of federal contractors.
If the California statute is invalidated, it will not necessarily mean
that all state action setting prices for federal contractors, as a part of
a greater regulatory scheme encompassing all similar business inter-
ests within the state, will also be invalid. State rate regulation of
intrastate shipments of government property could continue to be
valid. The crux of the opposition to California's statute seems to be,
not the added cost to the military departments, but the possibility that
additional, though unknown (and repudiated by California officials),
regulation could take place. California's law seeks to empower the
Public Utilities Commission to "impose such conditions as it may
consider just and necessary." (Unless additional conditions are in
fact imposed, conditions which could be called an undue or substantial
burden, would the statute be invalid? Probably not, for it is not the
statute as written, but as administered, which is important. The mere
existence of a possible threat, a possibility which may never eventu-
ate, is not by itself sufficient to allow challenge of its constitutional-
ity.) 50 Other state statutes which seek merely to require that carriers
49. Id. at 190. The charitable view to take of Judge Lemmon's opinion is
that, as the quotation indicates, he is begging the question before the court.
50. Otherwise, a judicial decision would be an advisory opinion, something
federal courts do not render.
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must haul for all at the same rate would not necessarily come within a
decision invalidating California's statute. Georgia, for example, has a
statute5' which does not mention the federal government; in the
administration of this statute, the state officials seek to have the
federal government treated identically with other contractors for
intrastate shipments of goods. Although the Comptroller General of
the United States thought otherwise, this could easily be held to be
distinguishable from the California case.
52
In any event, here is a problem area in need of some clarification.
So long as the national government and its activities occupied only a
minor role in American life, there was little need to establish the
status of the federal contractor vis-a-vis state governments. But when,
as is now the case, the federal government makes continuing major
interventions into the marketplace, it has become important that the
status of the federal contractor become clear. It would be desirable
from three standpoints-the federal procurement officer, the state
officials, and the contractor himself-to know how far a state can go
in regulating the federal contractor, as well as how far the state can
go in taxing that contractor.
Here, again, Congress has undoubted power to step in and set the
matter straight. But again, Congress has been even more reluctant
to do so than in the taxation field. At stake here is not the financial
burdens involved in the problem of state taxation of federal con-
tractors, but of balancing the state's exercise of its police powers with
51. GA. CODE ANN. § 68-614 (1957).
52. In Decision B-128238, 36 Comp. Gen. 218 (Sept. 18, 1956), the Comp-
troller General cited the California case as controlling the question of whether
a state may set rates for the intrastate truck shipments of federal property.
It is worthy of mention that such a decision does not render a state power-
less. For example, the Georgia Public Service Commission retaliated to the
Comptroller General's decision by ordering a trucker to show cause why his
certificate of convenience of necessity should not be revoked for failure to
comply with the Georgia law setting rates for truck shipments. The trucker
had bid on a Navy contract for the shipment of household goods at rates
other than those prescribed by the Public Service Commission. The Com-
mission suspended the trucker's certificate until it was demonstrated that
violations had ceased. Rule Nisi Against Flanigan The Moving Man, Inc.,
File No. MCA-8789, Docket No. 1134-M, Ga., May 20, 1957. It would seem,
thus, that the federal government may, in some instances at least, find itself
unable to enter into any contracts for some required services unless it is
willing to dispense with its price competition policies.
It is also noteworthy that the Hoover Commission recommended that the
practice of hauling federal property free or at reduced rates in interstate
commerce be eliminated. See U.S. COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EX-
EcUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT ON TRANSPORTA-
TION 31-55 (1955): Recommendation No. 21 of the Commission (see their
Report on Transportation c. VIII) reads in part as follows: "That the National
Transportation Policy, as set forth in the Interstate Commerce Act, the Civil
Aeronautics Act and the Merchant Marine Act, be studied and revised by the
Congress to make it more definite and detailed. When this is done the Gov-
ernment in its capacity as a user of transportation should conform to that
policy with respect to its commercial-type traffic." Id. at 96.
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the interest in the unfettered operation of national governmental
activities.
SOVIE CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
It was recently maintained that "the increasing participation of
public authority in contracts creates the wider and as yet generally
unexplored problem of the dual function of the state, as a superior
and as an equal."53 The position of the federal government as a con-
tractor is in need of clarification, both with regard to its position vis-A-
vis the contractors themselves and with regard to whether the tradi-
tional immunities of the federal system will be held to apply to its
contractors. Much of the law applicable to federal contracts is not yet
settled; much of it is in the process of formation, drawing varying
interpretations.m
The organ of government in the best position to accomplish this job
of clarification is Congress. But it is improbable that it will be so
done. Congress has shown little interest in wanting to deal compre-
hensively with the problem or with any of its facets.55 Left, accord-
ingly, to the judiciary will be the problem of establishing doctrinal
categories at such times as the accident of litigation has brought a
sufficient number of diverse factual situations before the courts. When
the job is being done-ultimately by the Supreme Court-no doubt
one of the chief motivations will be considerations of federalism, the
notions of the proper sphere of activity for the two systems of govern-
ment. Certainly no major departure from the historical doctrinal
pattern can be forecast. However, it is entirely possible that some
regulation, as well as some taxation, of federal contractors by the
states will be upheld. The contractor will probably have to obtain
local licenses,5 and may well be subject to some price regulation.
53. FRIEDMANN, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN 44
(1951).
54. See Pasley, The Interpretation of Government Contracts: A Plea For
Better Understanding, 25 FORDHAm L. REV. 211 (1956).
55. It may well be that the only people who are really interested in preserv-
ing the essentials of a viable system of dual federalism are some Supreme
Court Justices-for example, Justice Frankfurter, who in some of his opinions
displays concern for the maintenance of such a system-and some academicians,
see the several articles compiled in FEDERALISM: MATURE AND EMERGENT (Mac-
Mahon ed. 1955). Neither of these have, in final analysis, the power to do
much about establishing and maintaining such a system. Congressmen
elected from local districts and even state governors have not been particularly
interested in doing anything significant about changing the present-day system
of national federalism, the pious protestations in too numerous political
speeches to the contrary. In this regard the reaction of state .governors to
President Eisenhower's proposal in June 1957 to return some federal power to
the states is instructive. See note 58, infra.
56. Compare the recent decision in Public Housing Administration v.
Bristol Township, 146 F. Supp. 859 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (upholding state require-
ment of license for federal contractor on a housing project) with Decision
B-131556 of the Comptroller General of the United States, rendered May 27,
1957, 25 U.S.L. WEEK 2587 (June 11, 1957) (no state license required for
construction contract at an Air Force base in California, the decision being
based on the Leslie Miller case).
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For the state governments, the job would be that of building as
compelling a case as is possible for the necessity of overall state regu-
lation to protect important local interests. In addition to that, there
is the opportunity for the legal craftsman to help the Supreme Court
steer its way out of the conceptual paths it has gotten itself into. This
would be true for both taxation and regulation. More than concep-
tualism is involved here: the use of concepts hides the real policy
choices to be made. And so long as Congress retains the power, under
the principle of federal supremacy, to protect any federal activity,
Chief Justice Marshall's dictum that the power to tax is the power to
destroy has little validity. Moreover, as was recently stated, "Today...
this original concept [enunciated by Marshall] is now available as a
tool for the former potential victim to throttle the former potential
destroyer. '57 Even under a conceptual approach, it may be possible to
avoid-the impact of the legal incidence test of taxation of federal prop-
erty by creating persuasive arguments to show that a taxable interest
in federally-owned property rests in the possessor (the contractor)
of the property.
Taxation and regulation, although dealt with together in the cases,
may possibly end with differing results. It is easily provable that
states have a valid interest in additional revenue to come from the
federal contractor; and it is true that the burden of such taxes would
at most be economic. The states provide services for the contractors-
fire protection, police protection, schools for the employees, and so
on-which are benefits conferred on the contractor. It is equitable
that the state be in turn reimbursed for these services by the recipients
of the benefits. A compelling case can be constructed for more taxa-
tion, a case which in essence would look for the preservation of strong
local governments.5 8 The fiscal requirements of the states would not
be satisfied by allowing for more taxation of federal contracting ac-
tivities, but it would be at least a step in that direction.
57. Statement by Congressman D'Ewart of Montana, appearing in Report
on Taxes and Other In-lieu Payments on Federal Property VII (report pre-
pared by LEGisLATrv REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, under title of
FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP AND THE PUBLIC LAND LAWS, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
1954).
58. In an address at the Conference of State Governors on June 24, 1957,
President Eisenhower challenged the states to reassert their traditional powers
and responsibilities. See N.Y. Times, June 25, 1957, p. 16, col. 2. This was
essentially a call for both "states' rights" and "states' responsibilities." The
reception the President received was lukewarm at best, the governors dis-
playing a remarkable lack of interest in shouldering more responsibilities.
Apparently some of them were horrified that anyone, least of all the President,
would take their speeches about "states' rights" seriously.
Nevertheless, there are values for the preservation of which a viable
system of dual federalism may be the best vehicle. See, in this regard, WMTE,
THE STATES AND THE NATION (1953); ANDERSON, THE NATION AND THE STATES,
RIVALS OR PARTNERS? (1955); Freund, Federalism in America, 10 PERSPECTIVES
USA, Winter 1955, p. 5.
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But regulation poses different questions, and when imposed, is
designed to further different interests. Here it may be more difficult
to build a strong case for the local interests which should be served.
Here the substantiality of the resulting burden on the federal govern-
ment may well be the touchstone of validity. When the regulation is
one for fire protection or other safety measures, then the state power
should, and doubtless would, be upheld. If, however, the regulation is
one for furthering some such interest as the lessening of out-of-state
competition, as may have been true in the Leslie Miller case, then the
local interest is slight indeed and should be struck down. Price regula-
tion of shipments of federal property intrastate should, it would seem,
be upheld, for the slight additional economic burden is of no conse-
quence to the federal government.
In either instance-taxation or regulation-the federal contractor
should not be completely immune from state power. Save in examples
of actual substantial conflict with a federal activity, the private con-
tractor should be subject to the same laws as are other private business
firms in the state. It receives the benefits and protections of state law,
and it should have the responsibility of adhering to it and helping
pay for it. It is understandable that federal procurement officials
would wish to minimize state intervention into contracting matters.
Their job is one of extreme complexity and great difficulty. Adding
further elements of uncertainty and further cost to the budget, while
certainly not insuperable would add to the complexity and difficulty.
But if there are interests to be served by strong state and local gov-
ernments, then the additional burden should not be held to control
the course of judicial decision. A regard for the niceties of a viable
federal system will cut through resort to outmoded concepts. A regard
for the values to be protected by a viable system could well have some
influence on the flow of decisions, whether legislative or judicial in
origin. 59
59. Cf. the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy in Pacific Coast Dairy,
Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285, 303 (1943). -
